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State v. Booze:
TRIAL COURT
ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION BY
ALLOWING STATE
TO REOPEN ITS
CASE AT
REBUTTAL STAGE
TO PRESENT
CUMULATIVE AND
CORROBORATIVE
WITNESS TESTIMONY WHICH IMPAIRED
DEFENDANTS' FAIR
TRIAL RIGHTS.

In State v. Booze, 334
Md. 64, 637 A.2d 1214 (1994),
the Court of Appeals of Maryland unanimously held that a
prosecutor's mistaken beliefthat
eyewitness testimony was appropriate rebuttal evidence was
not good cause for reopening
the State's case-in-chief. In so
holding, the court determined
that the trial court abused its
discretion when it allowed the
State to reopen its case at the
rebuttal stage to present cumulative and corroborative eyewitness testimony which impaired defendants' right to a fair
trial.
Respondents Donald
Eugene Booze, Jr. and Allen
Shelton Snead were charged
with the murders of Antonio
Brandon Henderson and Isaac
Durant. In the Circuit Court
for Baltimore City, witnesses
for the State testified to seeing
Respondents fire guns and to
hearing gunshots. Another State
witness, Officer Constantine,
testified that he had encountered Snead fleeing from the
area of the shooting and had
heard gun shots coming from
the direction from which Snead
was running. After the State
rested, Snead presented a defense theory supportive ofOfficer Constantine's testimony,
namely, that respondents were
fleeing from a gun battle in which
they were not involved.
The State then presented
a rebuttal witness, Perry S.
Knight. When it became apparent that Knight was also an eyewitness to the murders, Respon-

dents objected, stating that the
rebuttal was improper. The
State argued thatKnight'stestimony, which accounted for the
gunshots fired while respondents fled the scene, directly
rebutted Snead's defense theory.
Upon discovering that
the State learned of Knight
prior to closing its case, the trial
court ruled that his testimony
was proper rebuttal to the extent that it explained the source
of the gunfire from which Respondents fled. However, the
court expressed concern about
the rest of Knight's testimony.
As to that portion of Knight's
testimony, the court determined
that it reflected an eyewitness
account of what occurred and
was not rebuttal at all. Rather,
it amounted to "direct" evidence which should have been
presented in the State's case-inchief. Despite this determination, the trial court granted the
State's motion to reopen its casein-chief, stating that the jury
should not be deprived of relevant evidence. Further, the
court stated that neither the State
nor the defense should be punished for the State's failure to
present evidence when it should
have.
On appeal, the State argued that the trial court implicitly and explicitly made the requisite findings to sustain its exercise of discretion. The Court
ofSpecial Appeals ofMaryland
reversed the decision of the circuit court. The Court of Appeals of Maryland granted certiorari to resolve the question of
whether the trial court abused
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its discretion in allowing the
State to reopen its case at the
rebuttal stage of the trial and
affirmed the court of special
appeals.
The court of appeals
began its analysis by acknowledging thattrial courts are vested
with broad discretion in the conduct of trials. Id., at 68, 637
A.2d at 1216 (citations omitted). The court stated that in the
usual case, what constitutes rebuttal testimony rests within the
sound discretion of the trial
court. Id. (citations omitted).
The court then proceeded to a
discussion of the discretion a
trial court exercises in determining what evidence is rebuttal and that which it exercises in
determining whether to vary the
order of proof. Id. at 69, 637
A.2d at 1216 (citing Hepple v.
State, 31 Md. App. 525, 534,
358 A.2d283, 290 (1976), aff'd,
State v. Hepple, 279 Md. 265,
368 A.2d 445 (1977)). The
court stated that the judge must
consider whether the State deliberately withheld the evidence
proffered in order to gain an
unfair advantage by its impact
on the trier of facts. Id. To this
end, the court noted that the
judge must discern whether the
proposed evidence is merely cumulative to, or corroborative
of, that already offered in chief
or whether it is important or
essential to a conviction. Id. at
69,637 A.2d at 1216-17. Finally, the court noted that regardless of how much discretion it may have to vary the
order of proof or to admit rebuttal evidence, a court may not

exercise either discretion interchangeably with the other. Id.,
at 70, 637 A.2d at 1217 (citations omitted).
The court addressed the
issue of whether reopening the
State's case impaired Respondents' ability to answer or otherwise receive a fair trial. Id. at
76, 637 A.2d at 1220. The
court stated that while good
faith, or at least a reasonable
basis for withholding the evidence must be considered, the
trial court's conclusion in that
regard varied and was therefore
unclear. Id. What was clear to
the court was that the trial court
determined that the State was
aware of the importance of
Knight's testimony before it
closed its case, and the subsequent failure to call Knight in its
case-in-chief was intentional,
rather than inadvertent. Id. at
77, 637 A.2d at 1220. The
court of appeals acknowledged
that the trial court's determination may not have been made in
bad faith. Id. Nevertheless,
misconceiving the nature ofthe
evidence and the stage of the
proceedings at which it was admissiblewas not necessarily acting in good faith, and in this case
did not constitute good cause
for reopening the State's case.
Id.
The court then focused
on Respondents' defense, which
used an ambiguity in the State's
case to create reasonable doubt
in the minds of the jurors. The
court emphasized that such use
of an ambiguity does not license
the State to use direct evidence,
of which it was aware before

closing its case, to explain away
the ambiguity. Id. at 78, 637
A.2d at 1221. Moreover, because it was rather dramatic testimony presented after the Respondents' defense, such evidence was quite likely to be
given undue emphasis by the
trier of fact. Id. The court of
appeals explained that the trial
court failed to consider the prejudicial impact, or probable prejudicial impact, of Knight's testimony on the trier of fact. Id.
Thus, the trial court did not
directly address the likelihood
that his testimony would render
a fair trial impossible for both
Respondents. Id.
The court rejected the
State's argument that the trial
court made the requisite findings to sustain its exercise of
discretion: that the State did not
act in bad faith and that the
improper rebuttal did not substantially prejudice the respondents. Id. at 79, 637 A.2d at
1222. The court of appeals
pointed out that although the
trial court's findings supported
the conclusion that the prosecutor did not act in bad faith, the
determination was undermined
by the trial court's characterization of the prosecutor's reasons
for withholding Knight as a rebuttal witness as "phony." Id.
Recognizing that neither the intent nor motive prong
is dispositive, the State argued
that the trial court explicitly
found that reopening the State's
case would not be prejudicial to
Respondents. Id. at 80, 637
A.2d at 1222. The State bolstered its theory by underscor-

:~T"'~;;~~-,"'':"i2:':-=-'37''''''S>::,~-::<C~-::l.'D,:':-,-:::~_-U::(''';~,-': '" 7~1::';";::,:":'D..:'S"',~L_."':'::e.~_.;,,::::-:.'3'!_;£1.,'"t,..o='::' ..:,::.
.----~.--,.-

..--.---------.-"-..-----.. --. ------»..

:..:"Z;;:~::." :;"'";-i-_;;::~:'; .s':'=:,

,--,--~--,,<----,-,-,,-,,_,_

ing the trial court's determination that Knight's testimony
occurred just two hours and
two witnesses after the State
rested. It further maintained
that this sequence ofevents suggested that the trial court found
that the defense had not been
prejudiced by the late presentation of Knight's testimony. Id
The court of appeals flatly rejected this argument, stating that
while the length of the defense
and the interval between when
testimony should have been
given and when it was given
were factors to be considered in
determining whether the defense
was prejudiced, such factors
were not dispositive nor the most
important factors to be considered. Id
In applying its analysis
to the case at bar, the court of
appeals stated that the prosecutor elected not to offer Knight's
testimony because she erroneously believed it to be proper
rebuttal evidence. Id However, the bulk of Knight's testimony was improper rebuttal as
it neither explained, replied to,
nor contradicted new matters
presented by the Respondent.
Id at 76, 637 A.2d at 1220 n.4
(citing Thomas v. State, 301
Md. 294, 309,483 A.2d 6, 14
(1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S.
1088 (1985)). By failing to
offer such evidence in its casein-chief, the State allowed an
ambiguity to exist, ofwhich the
defense sought to take advantage. Id at 80, 637 A.2d at
1222. The court held that when
a defendant presents evidence
at the close of the State's case,
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the State may not reopen its
case simply to have the last word.
Id The court further asserted in
the instant case that once the
trial court determined Knight's
testimony was improper rebuttal, it could not then allow the
State to reopen its case-in-chief,
as that would result in unfairly
permitting the State to piecemeal its case. Id The court of
appeals concluded that allowing the State to offer such clarifying evidence was prejudicial
as amatteroflaw. Id at 81, 637
A.2d at 1222.
State v. Booze is significant because it emphasizes the
importance ofjudicial economy
and the desirability ofmaintain-
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ing a fair and orderly trial. In
exercising discretion to allow
the State to reopen its case, a
trial judge must consider the
nature of the testimony and its
relationship to testimony already
presented. To allow a party to
introduce rebuttal evidence of
which it was fully aware at the
beginning oftrial would place a
premium on ignorance and lack
of preparedness rather than on
diligence and preparation. Finally, courts will more likely
consider whether the prejudicial impact of the admission of
challenged testimony undermines a defendant's right to a
fair trial.
- Kimberly C. Foreman

